The Idea of Citizenship:
A Historical Survey

Adrian Velicu

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Preface

*The Idea of Citizenship: An Historical Survey* is the 21st working paper within CEFOS series of working papers. This paper will be part of a planned, so called, ‘knowledge review’ which together with other papers will lay the foundation for a new research theme at CEFOS concerning *Local Citizenship*.

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Lars Strömberg
Director, CEFOS
Abstract

This brief survey attempts to follow the idea of citizenship from its origins to our times. Fifth century BC Athens provides the early example of participatory democracy, while Rome shows how the requirements of an extended empire lead to a diversification and dilution of the quality of citizenship. The waning of citizenship during the Middle Ages contains the exception of the Italian city-republics, while the rise of absolutism in the sixteenth century occasions theories justifying the surrendering of power by the citizen, now a subject, to an omnipotent sovereign. The emphasis on the equal worth of all rational individuals and the social, political and economic changes round 1800 increase the significance of rights in the evolution of the concept, but also of the concrete status of belonging to a community. The increasing autonomy of political thought, the complexity of the nation-states, and the availability of resources mark a change in the way citizenship is conceived. The survey closes with a few instances of contemporary discussions of citizenship against the background of globalization and migration.
Initial Requirements

The importance of context becomes decisive when it comes to outlining the early quality of citizenship and its development. The kind of community people find themselves in determines to a large extent the set of attributes they would possess as members of the group. Thus, the shift from belonging to a clan to belonging to a large community of unrelated people having equal claims to membership of the group has been seen as one of the first clearly outlined versions of citizenship (Pocock 1995, p. 30). A degree of impersonality appears to have been necessary for the introduction of various regulations when people who considered themselves equal to each other, excluding in process quite a few others, attempted to rule and be ruled.

In addition to the importance of community, an overview of the idea of citizenship must equally, if not more, take into account the outlook on human nature at particular times in history. The recent debates between democratic liberals and communitarians show which chief characteristics have been assumed to offer a proper point of departure. The liberals regard the individual as an autonomous entity entitled to protection to facilitate personal development, while the communitarians see a person as basically a social being, stressing development through participation and sharing (Dauenhauer 1996, p. 6). These two views have been traced back to two different lines of thought, determining the quality of the status of citizen and the purpose and shape of the political framework. Fulfilment through the collective as a chief characteristic of human beings has been stressed by philosophers such as Aristotle and Rousseau, while the autonomy of the individual has been underlined by Locke and Kant, among other thinkers. Other criteria to do with class, gender or age are also relevant to the development of citizenship, their role in the debate changing along with the shifting social and political patterns.

Tracing the origin of citizenship presupposes establishing the stage at which the polis became properly crystallized. That means looking for the characteristics which would indicate the presence of political autonomy, a defined territory and a central authority in charge with military, financial, judicial, and religious matters (Manville 1990, p. 53). The process between the initial joining together of a few households and the clearly outlined polis (city state) was completed by the sixth century BC. It was early this century that Solon initiated a number of legal measures which provided the foundation of citizenship (Manville 1990, p. 69; the following is based on pp. 124-44). Most of these measures had to do with defining boundaries of various kinds, including legal and geographical ones, and thus accentuating the conditions of belonging or being excluded. An important law which contributed to the distinction between citizen and non-citizen decreed that Athenians could not enslave members of their own community.
After occasional turbulent periods during the sixth century BC when various factions imposed a tyrannical rule, the status of citizenship was invoked and further clarified in the wake of internal conflicts. Solon had already made a start on establishing who belonged to the community and who did not, but the *dipsephismos* at the end of the century – a civic scrutiny deciding who was a proper member of the Athenian population – brought to the fore the issue of citizenship during what seems to have been a reign of terror. (Such a close examination of the civic status of the inhabitants would recur much later in history, for example in the 1930s in Nazi Germany, with the same purpose of withdrawing citizenship rights from certain groups.) The significance of such a scrutiny for the development of the concept of citizenship cannot be separated from the factional interests of excluding recently settled mercenaries in Athens or other non-Athenians whose presence strengthened a particular faction. The subsequent reconciliatory reforms of Cleisthenes facilitated the emergence of *isonomia*, equal status in relationship to law. This was a further step towards the formation of a community whose members were granted equal legal importance.
Persons in Action: The Greek Ideal

It can be argued that by the end of the sixth century BC the institution of citizenship was fully developed (Manville 1990, p. 205). Along with the awareness of membership of the community (increasingly a city-state, a politeia), the legal status of foreigners (metakoi – those allowed to reside in Athens but as non-citizens lacking access to legal and other benefits, and proxenoi – foreign representatives possessing certain privileges) was also taking shape. The concept of citizenship acquired a firm outline at the turn of the century as it became a "legal grant" which could be awarded to certain foreigners, by then a valuable gift meant to honour the outsider and place him on an equal footing with the large resident group which enjoyed this position. Whether citizenship was a recognizable concept by 500 BC, or emerged properly between Cleisthenes' period and the middle of the fifth century, by the time Pericles delivered the funeral oration recorded by Thucydides the active participation of the polites (citizens) had become a defining feature.

In his praise of the Athenian commonwealth Pericles points out as a commendable aspect that among all peoples only Athenians "... regard the man who takes part in no such things [political matters] not as one who minds his own business, but as one who has no business here at all" (qtd. in Manville 1990, p. 15). This difference between the inhabitants of this Greek city and other individuals emphasized in 430 BC is developed about one hundred years later by Aristotle (incidentally, a foreigner in Athens) into one of the chief ways for a human being to achieve fulfilment. The ideal of moral development by means of participation in public activity and not in private retirement had a decisive influence on the close integration of the individual into the commonwealth. Consequently, citizenship was seen less as a legal status, which later ages would be familiar with, but as a way of life. This degree of integration is obvious in the semantic range, some would say ambiguity, of the term politeia which meant both 'constitution' and 'commonwealth' or 'republic.' Therefore the person (polites) involved in these entities was both a resident in a community and a contributor to the set of principles that determined the running of the polis. Specialization implying, as ever, exclusion, the later semantic differentiation would not only reflect a clearer outline of these institutions and concepts, but also the fact that a citizen of a commonwealth would not necessarily be a contributor to its constitution.

Aristotle rest his argument about citizenship on the nature and purpose of human beings, as well as the manner of reaching their goal. People are social creatures, their aim is to achieve happiness, and the way to do this is by exercising their most characteristic abilities. Apart from the highest ideal of a life of philosophical contemplation, human beings would be expected to shape the state by their activity as individuals who prefer to reason and live together. A citizen is someone who has the "... right to participate in judicial functions and in office" but Aristotle’s outlook on
human nature limits citizenship to Greek males: some people are slaves by nature (as a rule, the non-Greeks), while women are only imperfect men, unable to reason properly (Aristotle, tr. Rackham, 1972, p. 175). Since birth from Athenian parents on the territory of the polis was strongly emphasized, foreigners were also excluded from citizenship. The citizen as defined by Aristotle is a person enjoying enough leisure and education to be able to contribute by word and deed to the running of the community. Since a slave is considered a living tool, it is obvious that work does not have the importance which it would acquire later for the definition of a citizen.

The degree to which social, religious, political and personal codes overlapped in early Greek law shows how closely the individual was integrated in the community as shown above by the way one term did the work performed by several later on. To a large extent this integration was due to the small number of inhabitants, the lack of institutional complexity and the relatively short distances which facilitated the direct participation of the native males in the public affairs.
Persons, Actions and Things:

A Roman Addition

The Greek ideal of citizenship was characterized particularly by the concept of political activity as a good action in itself which contributed decisively to the individual's moral development, and not as an instrumental action (Pocock 1995, pp. 34 ff for this and the subsequent point). Separation from 'things' (implied also in the lack of value attributed to work) determined the concept of belonging to the community, but the ideal of citizenship would change once 'things' would acquire a new importance within an emerging juridical framework.

The conception of the universe assumed by Roman jurisprudence as being made up of "persons, actions and things" supplied a new way of understanding relationships in society and, indirectly, a way of defining the nature of the individual as a legal being. The legal codification that presupposed persons acting on things introduced the notion of property and along with it a new criterion of defining individuals and their impact on each other. A wide range of possible relationships needed regulation which meant that a person knew when he was acting according to the law and when he could resort to a legal instance in order to get protection or claim a right. And this is precisely the direction in which the concept of citizen was moving in the Roman world, from its predominant sense of exercising one's duty in the polis to that of becoming aware of, and claiming one's rights in a large community characterized by its common law. An impersonal note emerged in the concept of citizenship, practically absent in the Athenian version based on face-to-face participatory democracy.

The term used by the Romans (civis) was still derived from a clearly defined urban settlement (civitas), although in time it indicated belonging to a far-flung empire. (This semantic anomaly has indeed survived to this day.) The process of semantic differentiation was lagging behind the political one at this early stage: civitas still meant 'constitution,' 'commonwealth,' 'city' and 'citizenship,' even if administratively things were becoming more complex. But constitutio was rapidly catching up, moving from the sense of 'act of settling' to 'regulation' and soon taking over the conceptual space suggested by 'fundamental principles governing a state.'

The expansion of the Roman empire brought along a more passive form of citizenship as this status was granted to distant groups and individuals in order to gain their loyalty and integrate the new conquests. This occurred during the consolidation of the Roman power under Augustus. The connection between Latin birth and citizenship became less strict as citizenship was acquired more as an honour rather than for its political significance (Sherwin-White 1973, p. 222). Once more, the context determined to a large extent the character of membership in the community, a status
which was bound to change from the restricted and homogeneous population of a Greek polis to the expanding collection of ethnic groups throughout a vast empire. In the early stages of expansion Roman citizenship was granted selectively since it carried certain privileges, but by the time of Claudius’s rule (middle of the first century AD) whole communities applied for, and received it. There was no unanimity of opinion on this course of action. While Tacitus was bemoaning the granting of citizenship to all and sundry by the beginning of the second century, a few decades later the writers of the ‘second Sophistic’ regarded the idea of Roman citizenship less as a diluted concept and more as one which aimed to embrace the entire known world, invoking entities such as communis patria, and reaching the principle that “… no one is a foreigner who is worthy” (Sherwin-White 1973, p. 259).

Despite the “decline of the practical content of the citizenship” (ibid, p. 272) throughout the second century, those who benefited from it were still part of the Roman legal framework and possessed the right of appeal when threatened by the power of the local magistrate. The example of St Paul escaping punishment by claiming that he was a Roman citizen, even if only from Tarsus (Acts, 22: 25-29, 23:27), illustrates the kind of privilege such a status could confer. Yet, the prestige and the practical value of the citizenship kept declining in the latter part of the second century as more and more people enjoyed the title. Indeed, in 212 Caracalla granted Roman citizenship to all the free inhabitants of the empire. This was no doubt part of the effort to consolidate its unity by incorporating the conquered territories into an overall orbis Romanus (Roman world), particularly under the increasing threats of invasion by the populations along its borders. It was at this time that the terms subditus or subjectus were beginning to be used particularly in the eastern regions of the Roman Empire. These were conquered groups who could apply for citizenship, but even if they did not, they were forced to remain within the empire.

There were thus different categories of citizenship of which some did not include the right to vote. Yet an idea gaining ground at this time may have facilitated the acceptance of (almost) all people as citizens in equal measure. The Stoic tenet that each soul shares equally in the divine reason shows that the outlook on human nature had moved quite a long way from Aristotle’s teaching about some people being slaves by nature. Cicero argued that people are equal because of the universal law of reason which applies to every human being. The historical point where ancient citizenship ceases to be relevant to our modern (or post-modern) concerns can vary according to different historians, but in one basic respect this may be a significant turning-point; mentioning Kant’s rephrasing of this ideal in terms of treating human beings as ends and not as means, Sabine remarked that Cicero is closer to Kant than to Aristotle (Sabine 1964, p. 165). And fifty years before Roman citizenship was extended to all free persons within the empire, the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius was pondering upon this very matter. Already the Cynics and Epicureans granted greater importance to individual autonomy and moral development than to the Aristotelian collective virtues. But “[i]t was the Stoics who reformulated a notion of civic obligation” (Turner 1992, p. 48). Moreover, Christianity introduced a dimension of universalisms surpassing
the imperial efforts to include most people in the sphere of the Roman world. Establishing faith as the foundation of the community of human beings with its corollary of a covenant between the individual and a divine entity, Christianity provided some of the main elements of later political theory (Turner 1986, pp. 16-17). According to this argument, the divine covenant provided a model for a contract between citizens, opening the way for a new manner of conceiving relationships between members of the same community, or persons who intend to set up a community.
The Waning of Citizenship and the Italian Exception

The importance of citizenship faded out during the Middle Ages as other forms of membership of the community such as serfdom and vassalage tended to impose themselves. Due to local circumstances, a form of citizenship resembling somewhat the Athenian one emerged in the city republics of northern and central Italy during the first centuries of the second millennium. The outline of a form of citizenship became firmer once more because of a certain amount of autonomy enjoyed by quite a few cities in this area. Confined urban communities to which were added the surrounding rural areas had to find ways of running their affairs which necessitated the regulation of the status of their inhabitants in order to determine who was entitled to rule, to elect the rulers or simply to enjoy a series of benefits conferred on the core of the local population.

It is difficult to establish the precise proportion of those who took part in the political process, yet it has been pointed out that there is a similarity to the ancient polis (Waley 1969, p. 109). While qualifications of residence and birth still played an important part in the citizenship requirements of the Italian city-states, the general attitude towards outsiders was different from that in ancient Greece. Persons from other communities were welcome to apply for citizenship; it is true that the idea was to attract wealth, but the shift is worth emphasizing. What is present at this stage is a differentiation between the citizens themselves. For instance the thirteenth century Constitution of Siena distinguished between “ancient, true and natural citizens” and “continual citizens” (Bowsky 1967, pp. 200-201). The former had been born in the city and their ancestors had been citizens for a long time, while the latter were outsiders who had been granted citizenship. Although the distinction would become blurred already in the following century, it is clear that the perception of some individuals as recent outsiders would linger even after their integration within the local society.

One reason why the detailed criteria for claiming citizenship would be neglected subsequently was simply the dwindling of this particular form of classical republicanism in the fourteenth century. Factionalism, instability and outside pressures led to the emergence of a form of absolutist rule where a local nobleman assumed practically complete power. Yet while the concrete circumstances became unfavourable to the exercise of civic qualities, the idea of political activity as a worthwhile goal for the inhabitants of a community re-emerged through the translation of Aristotle’s Politics in Latin towards the end of the thirteenth century. The term ‘politics’ used by Aristotle in the sense of a worthy activity was further developed by Dante in his Italian rendering (poliziere), amplifying the idea of valuable activity and implying participation (Clarke 1996, p. 64). Thus, if not in practice, the notion of politics as an
activity through which the individual is able to develop could be found at this point in European thought in the renewed presence of Aristotle’s argument. The idea of collective, direct participation in running the affairs of the community and endowed with a moral dimension has hardly returned in a material form, becoming rather the substance of utopian arguments such as Rousseau’s. The fact that something has been lost throughout the changes of the concept of citizenship has been acknowledged by Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 1992, pp. 3 and 5). Mouffe has pointed out that “active participation” has been overshadowed, if not totally removed by the rise of “liberal individualism,” and has to be recovered. Overlooking the phenomenon of passive or symbolic citizenship in its Roman guise, a non-participatory kind of citizenship with its own individual dimension preceding the liberal variety, Mouffe nevertheless points to a break in the development of the concept of citizenship. The status of citizen would begin again to take shape under the new dispensation of the absolutist monarchies and nation-states. Before proceeding with this modern phase, it is worth mentioning an argument which sees the two forms as being (briefly) reconciled.

According to Quentin Skinner, the stress placed on rights by the notion of citizenship giving priority to individual liberty has marginalized the pursuit of the common good in the vein of Aristotelian citizenship. This is not only a question of underlining a concept at the expense of another concept, but an outlook which could turn into a concrete policy of creating the conditions for maximizing individual liberty, cultivating rights at the expense of social duty (for this and the following points see Skinner 1992, pp. 215 ff). By returning to the period of classical republicanism Skinner argues that individual liberty and common good do not exclude one another but are in fact reconciled. In order to increase liberty, a member of the community must be very active in public service, “... placing the ideal of the common good above all considerations of individual advantage” (ibid, p. 217). The idea is present in Machiavelli’s writings on Livy and, by drawing on this pre-liberal source which hardly mentions rights at all, Skinner wishes to dispel what he sees as only an apparent paradox between two sets of values aiming at two types of citizenship. (It should be added that Machiavelli expresses an argument whose materialization in practice could be detected with some difficulty after the waning of city republicanism.) A somewhat similar idea can be encountered earlier in Marsiglio of Padua’s Defender of the Peace: the reason why authority ought to be located in the community of citizens is the combination of self-interest and the commitment to the existence of a well-functioning community within which the wishes of the individual could be fulfilled (Black 1992, p. 124).

The existence of the Italian civic governments has been seen as a unique phenomenon (Black 1992, p. 117). Cities had grown out of market-places where craftsmen gathered, organizing themselves in guilds, where it was feasible that the ruling councils should prescribe a certain amount of rotation and, initially, allow the participation of more than just a restricted number of nobles. The term itself as it emerged in the vernacular languages (citizen, citoyen, cittadino, bürger) shows that, as in ancient Athens, the status still grew out of belonging to urban communities. The time
when the word enters various languages – twelfth century in France, early thirteenth century in England – may attest to the stabilization of a particular vernacular, but it also indicates the time when this quality becomes a common notion. But ‘liberties’ sought by this new kind of community members were granted to groups (e.g. guilds) rather than to individuals. The significance attributed by the Renaissance to human beings as individuals and the rise of the absolutist states were taking the concept of citizenship in new directions.
Absolutism and Its Subjects

By the latter half of the sixteenth century a citizen would be defined by Jean Bodin in relationship to sovereignty which is the “absolute power over citizens and subjects” (Bodin 1992, p. 1). What characterizes the citizens of this kind of commonwealth is their subjection to a sovereign. It is the newly created framework of the absolutist state encompassing its inhabitants that defines their membership in the community regardless of language, religion or ability to act in a particular way. Bodin was writing at a time of religious wars and internal conflicts when it seemed that peace could be achieved by a vigorously centralized monarchy. Sharing sovereignty meant maintaining the possibility of future clashes. However, the consolidation of the absolute rule in the name of stability contributed to the development of the passive version of citizenship, for a long while in unfair competition with the active one (Turner 1992, pp. 52 ff). It is as a result of Bodin’s arguments and of Hobbes’ theories offered half a century later, that the term ‘citizen’ acquired a near-synonym, ‘subject’; the word almost became in English that elusive entity, a perfect synonym, while in French the distance between ‘citoyen’ and ‘sujet’ remained considerable, a fact emphasized by the 1789 Revolution. Turner is one of several historians and sociologists who have argued that citizenship has developed along two distinct lines, a passive and an active one. In those cases where an absolute sovereign handed down privileges (or provided protection, according to Hobbes) without the inhabitants having much say in running the affairs of the state, the passive element predominated (Heater 1990, p. 31). Wherever the inhabitants participated in some form in the political life of their community, the active aspect was cultivated and prevailed, and as an early example Turner refers to the Italian city-republics. Very approximately, the use of ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ followed the trajectory of the active and passive varieties citizenship. The exception of the ‘British subject’ being preserved as a term in one of the more tolerant Western democracies only serves to point out the anomaly. It is worth mentioning that it has been easier for the terms describing the active ‘citizen’ or ‘citoyen’ to develop a related word denoting the quality or the status – ‘citizenship,’ ‘citoyenneté’ – than for the passive ‘subject.’ ‘Sujetion,’ and ‘subjection’ stand in a different semantic relationship to the noun denoting the person. To show the degree of synonymity between the British ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ it is enough to notice the usage of the terms: a British subject has British citizenship not British subjection.

While the virtue of centralization turned the French into subjects, or accentuated their state of obedience, because of the importance of having a strong monarch, the inhabitants of Hobbes’ commonwealth would turn into subjects on their own initiative in order to ensure their protection. The Leviathan may have been an imaginary polity, but it was very much an attempt to explain the state of things in the absolutist states and later was used as such by the French counter-revolutionaries. The impact of
Hobbes’ contribution on the concept of citizenship was due to its presentation as the logical outcome of an attempt to solve a problem within a wider mechanistic framework.

The social context at the time both in Bodin and Hobbes’ case may have well influenced their emphasis on the individual’s obedience and on a strong ruler. Civil war and internal disruption made peace appear worthwhile even at the price of fairly strict subjection, although both thinkers had their doubts about irreversible absolutism. (Bodin himself had opposed the French king and had fallen out of favour, while Hobbes envisaged the removal of the sovereign if he failed to provide adequate protection for his subjects.) Hobbes’ view of human nature added a new aspect to the need for obeying one ruler: individuals would be a danger to one another because of basic human competitive struggle for power based on the desire of self-preservation. While Bodin may have had in mind aristocratic or religious factions violently disrupting the harmony of the realm when he assigned the citizens’ place in a kingdom, Hobbes is preoccupied by individuals behaving like particles in motion and extends his mechanistic reasoning to the social and political realm, building his theory on the need for individuals to ensure their protection against their fellow-beings.

As circumstances conditioning the development of the concept of citizenship, equality and authority occupy a significant place in Hobbes’ argument. The actions of human beings as conceived by Hobbes presuppose a basic equality of ability and purpose (Flathman 1995, pp. 124-25). Paradoxically enough (although logically, in the philosopher’s demonstration), the very lack of considerable differences in physical and mental abilities, or lack of justification that someone’s goal should prevail over someone else’s, ensure the perpetuation of conflict. Nobody can decisively defeat and dominate his fellow-inhabitants of the commonwealth. Hence the agreement to set up an authority as a solution to the problem. The obedience to the sovereign and the protection enjoyed as a result of this arrangement do not mean that the ruler is particularly different from the other individuals (ibid, p. 125). What is created here is an office rather than facilitating the rise of a particular individual to the throne. In the striking phrase of Flathman, “the subjects obey the Sovereign... to escape the horrendous consequences of their natural equality” (ibid, pp. 125-26). The result, indeed the risk, may well be that in the process authority is reinforced at the expense of citizenship which is seriously weakened if not eliminated altogether as a significant status of the person in the community.

Anticipating briefly, it can be mentioned here that the problem of authority due to the need for personal protection and national concord would be solved in time through the device of representation, raising the status of citizens to a new level of significance through the institution of franchise. Pufendorf seems less worried than Hobbes about the effects of equality. Apart from approximately similar physical and intellectual abilities, Pufendorf sees equality as mutual obligation by practising the “precepts of natural law” such as refraining from injuring others even if one may be endowed with “various gifts of mind and body” (Pufendorf 1991, p. 61). Obedience to the ruler is a defining feature of the citizen (ibid, p. 133), but the stress here is on working for the
public good which ultimately means that the individual should be “well disposed to his fellow-citizens” (ibid, pp. 133 and 175).
The Emergence of the Modern Citizen

In the meanwhile, the changing circumstances were outlining a new context in which the individual could invoke new values in order to cope with emerging pressures. As trade was expanding at an increasingly rapid rate round 1700, the freedom of the citizen (still very much a subject) was perceived as being at risk (Pocock 1995, p. 48). Rights never possessed before could be claimed now, such as appointing, and in time electing, representatives who would defend the members of the community.

Different premises from Hobbes’ underlie John Locke’s thoughts on membership of a community. The emphasis on the value of each individual and the concept of property understood in a comprehensive manner would lead to fresh reasons why and how a person ought to take his (hardly her) place in a community. For Locke a person is born “with a Title to perfect Freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the Rights and Privileges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other Man, or Number of Men in the World…” (Locke 1965, pp. 366-67). The strong emphasis on rights changes the nature of the ‘compact’ reached by people in order to come together and form a commonwealth. Not only is Locke’s view of human nature different from Hobbes’, but the Lockean agreement is based on consent and not necessarily imposed by fear, it does not envisage an absolute ruler, and it is constantly conditioned by the possession of rights derived from natural law. Instead of obeying a sovereign, the members of Locke’s “Civil Society” obey the majority (ibid, pp. 95-96). Later Rousseau would take this idea further and would thus add another dimension to the concept of citizenship, in the process giving the member of the community a controversial status.

Locke underlines the legitimacy of the newly formed political society by insisting on an explicit gesture on the part of the individual when joining it. What makes people proper “Subjects or Members of that Commonwealth” is “entering into it by positive Engagement, and express Promise and Compact” (ibid, p. 122). The active contribution of the individual to setting up the commonwealth advances the concept of citizenship in ways that part company with the passive subject of Bodin’s and Hobbes’. It is worth noting that although Locke used the term ‘subject,’ he saw the position of a person in the civil and political society quite differently from that envisaged by Hobbes; the term entered the language at about the same time as ‘citizen’ and seemed to be gaining ground without necessarily indicating that England was a more despotnic country than any other. However, Locke’s insistence on consent and rights has been seen as a radical change in political thought (Heater 1991, p. 31). The protection enjoyed by the members of the community is no longer granted by a sovereign, but by a political framework, the state, created by mutual agreement, attributing a particular significance to each citizen who participates in this process.

Protection implies political freedom for the citizen, according to Montesquieu (Montesquieu 1955, pp. 100-111). This has to do with the defence of the individual
against accusations which may threaten his person or goods. The concern is here with a sound constitution and a proper legal framework and it may have been caused by the arbitrariness of the ancien régime. Michael Walzer has seen Montesquieu’s argument as part of the “early-modern liberalism” to develop Bodin’s idea of protecting the citizen against the arbitrary power of the authorities (Walzer 1989, p. 215). This sequence of proto-liberal thinkers would include, according to Walzer, Hobbes and Locke. The implication of their concern with protection would be that the objects of protection – one’s physical life, conscience, family, property – acquire priority and shape a private sphere (ibid, pp. 215-16). This results in the emergence of “citizenship as enjoyment,” a status which presupposes the prevailing importance of rights and which requires the protection of a strong legal framework.

Having access to rights was also one of the chief defining characteristics of a citizen in Diderot’s definition in his Encyclopédie. Diderot emphasizes the aspect of benefiting from being a member of a free society by adding to “droits” also “franchises” – freedoms, privileges (Encyclopédie, 1751-1780, “Citoyen”). We have moved a long way from Aristotle’s participatory democracy where the element of duty was stressed, but this aspect would return again very soon in the writings of Diderot’s contemporary, Rousseau. One should add that Diderot defined an existing state of things, while Rousseau would outline what he considered an ideal situation. Diderot chose to make his point about the equality of the citizen in the state by replying to Puffendorf distinction between the descendants of those who founded the state, the only ones who could claim the status of citizen, and the others. Diderot qualified this distinction as “frivole” and asserted that all members of the community are equally noble in so far as they are citizens; the status of ‘nobility,’ in fact equality here, derives from sharing in the right to the position of magistrate in the community.

The virtue of citizenship as collective activity in debating, legislating and running the state (more realistically, the city-state) re-appears in Rousseau’s thoughts on the matter displayed in his Social Contract. Duties are again given priority over rights and the development of the active tradition of citizenship receives a fresh impetus. Public work is a way towards moral development, happiness can be found in the public sphere, above all, rather than in the private one. Rousseau’s outlook on citizenship means another turning point in the history of this concept, according to Walzer who is of the opinion that Rousseau “gives citizenship its modern philosophical grounding, connecting it to the theory of consent” (Walzer 1989, p. 212). The member of the community takes his proper place in a genuine commonwealth by surrendering his natural liberty in order to gain civil liberty, in other words giving up any limited individual initiatives and aspirations for the sake of the collective and comprehensive range of the general will (Rousseau n.d., p. 22). One of the achievements would be moral freedom and it is by this argument that Rousseau reconciles authority and individual: the citizen becomes his own master because by obeying the law prescribed by himself (as part of the general will) he becomes free. Consent is reached here by redefining liberty in terms of legislation, thus shifting also the level where authority is exercised. It is an active consent, radically different from Locke’s which was assumed
as long as the citizen went inhabiting the commonwealth and accepting its arrangements.

Rousseau introduces also the complex issue of representation in relationship to sovereignty and citizenship. Consistent throughout, even if causing later difficulties of interpretation and implementation, Rousseau argues that "[s]overeignty cannot be represented for the same reason for which it cannot be alienated; essentially it consists in the general will which cannot be represented..." (ibid, p. 103). The presence of the citizen as part of the community is given and all-encompassing, it cannot be established once more elsewhere. People’s deputies are only its envoys, messengers, they cannot decide anything by themselves, "... those laws not ratified personally by the people are null and void..." (ibid, p. 103). The brave efforts during the French Revolution to stay as close as possible to the master’s dictum bear witness to the practical difficulties of this uncompromising line. However, it is in this manner that "l’être moral souverain" which Diderot saw as replacing the absolute ruler would be achieved: the citizens themselves embody sovereignty which is the decisive way they can develop morally.

This was to a large extent what the French Revolution attempted as far as citizenship and morality were concerned. The various turning points in the history of the idea of citizenship are dwarfed by this radical redefinition of the concept of the citizen and its significance for the nation. The subjects, the great majority of the Frenchmen, proclaimed themselves citizens with an equal status in the new nation made up by themselves. The announcement of the Third Estate that its members were the nation transformed a “people” without rights into a nation assuming sovereignty. (Earlier the term ‘nation’ had been reserved for the aristocracy and the higher clergy.)

The title of the famous declaration of August 1789 (“Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen”) appears to use person and citizen as synonyms. (The distinction made by Marx, after the Hegelian pattern, between “man” as a member of the civil society and “citizen” as a member of the state, and his elucidation of “droits de l’homme” as “the rights of egoistic man” misses the point repeatedly made by the French revolutionaries about the universality and equal value of human beings leading consistently to their recognition as citizens [Marx, 1975, p. 162]).) The first articles emphasize equality among people, the protection of natural rights, and the location of sovereignty within the nation which is the community of all citizens (Roberts, ed., 1966, pp. 171-72). The identification of the nation with the community of citizens creates the connection between nationality and citizenship, a link which in later decades and centuries would cause difficulties when abused by the authorities.

The principle of civic equality was proclaimed and accepted by the revolutionaries in Paris, but that did not mean that every single person acquired complete civic rights. For instance, at various times some groups were excluded from the franchise, (actors, servants, women). For a while a distinction was made between active and passive citizens, and the rights to vote depended on certain property qualifications. The distinction between active and passive citizens had also been made by Kant who, nevertheless, argued that the passive ones should benefit from the full protection of the
laws and be equal in every other way to the active ones. The subsequent Terror and the long military dictatorship that ended with the restoration of the king do not change the fact that the concept of citizenship developed in the debates during the revolutionary years, and that this radical change provided evidence for later arguments, and an example for future initiatives.
Civic Awareness and Rights

Thus the further crystallization of the status of citizenship with its accompanying rights, all this coupled with the possibilities revealed by the principle of civic equality created the conditions for increasing demands that this status should be extended to include larger and larger groups of individuals. The massive social dislocation and the problems emerging as a result of the industrial revolution, already noticeable at the end of the eighteenth century, presented concrete reasons for which the new social groups demanded the extension of the status of citizenship. The emergence of the modern state – centralized, aiming at efficiency through a growing bureaucracy, controlling large resources which could be distributed in various ways to various groups – created the circumstances for the modern idea of citizenship that expanded through the incorporation of ever increasing numbers of individuals.

At this point it becomes possible to anticipate the growth of citizenship with the help of T.H. Marshall’s argument. Looking at the case of England, Marshall has suggested that citizenship has developed from the eighteenth to the twentieth century by acquiring three sets of rights throughout these three centuries, respectively. The conquest (or the ascription of) the civil, political and social rights meant the integration of the working-class in society. The institutions necessary to defend these rights became consolidated as part of the development of the modern state enabling the respective rights to establish themselves. The freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial were ensured by the law courts in the eighteenth century; the expansion of franchise in conjunction with the growing importance of the political parties and the secret ballot were protected by a proper parliament the following century, while the twentieth century saw the expansion of social rights such as welfare, social security, free education, all requiring a functioning welfare system (Marshall in Marshall & Bottomore 1992, pp. 8-13). Marshall’s theory has had its critics, yet, his argument shows the kind of context – institutional and otherwise – needed for citizenship to develop.

A sufficient stretch of the development of the concept of citizenship has been concisely covered so far to offer a range of instances, and to enable us to re-state the pattern suggested above, this time with the help of Michael Walzer’s reluctant generalization about citizenship. Walzer has argued that citizenship can be understood in two basic ways which he calls the republican and the imperial or liberal one (an uneasy pair of synonyms). The former regards citizenship as a responsibility, the latter as an entitlement, “a right or set of rights passively enjoyed” (Walzer 1989, p. 216). These two kinds of citizenship presuppose two different types of communities where the role of their members vary. Thus, the view of human beings and society recur as criteria of citizenship. However, new criteria have been taken into account as the social and economic changes accelerated after 1800.
Conflict, Mobility, Integration

In the early decades of the nineteenth century the increasingly forceful element of social conflict has been considered an increasingly relevant component in the development of the concept. As anticipated above, Marshall regards conflict as one of the chief ways in which rights have been gradually acquired, and, consequently, an important new element in the evolution of citizenship during the last three centuries. Other theoreticians tone down this aspect, but most of them have to take conflict into account in their analyses. In a very recent overview of the theoretical (but not historical) discussions about citizenship, the relevance of conflict has been ascribed to Marshall and Turner’s arguments, but less to the Durkeimian tradition which resorts to civic virtue as a relevant foundation, or to the Marxist one which tends to refer to civil society and world systems theory (Janoski 1998, pp. 6-7). The gradual acquiring of rights as part of the incorporation of the working-class, but not only, in the sphere of citizenship occurs through constant pressures. The growth of the modern state with its complexity has occasioned the formation of a private sphere of activities, associations and development usually called civil society. Indeed, according to Hegel, the formation of the modern state is a precondition of the appearance of the civil society (Hegel 1981, p. 266). Unlike the civically irrelevant private world of oikos in ancient Athens, civil society became in the modern state a valid way of cultivating and manifesting civic qualities. Along with the conflictual aspect, civil society becomes a component, often controversial, of the debates about citizenship.

The question has been whether this can constitute an autonomous sphere of civic activity. For Hegel civil society was “an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract” (Hegel 1981, p. 110). This is only an “external” way of attaining the individuals’ interests, and this “external state is brought back to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and the public life devoted thereto” (ibid.). The argument here is guided by Hegel’s assumptions about the importance of reason in human beings and the universal component in them which determines their move from the particular interests of the civil society to the comprehensive ones of the state. One of the chief goals is, again, moral fulfilment which can only be achieved within the state by realizing that personal freedom and the interest of the state (including the laws) coincide.

The concept of civil society has been put to other uses in the later analyses of citizenship and political education. In the 1980s and a lot more after 1989, civil society has been much invoked as an essential sphere of civic practice, a sphere whose absence in the pre-1989 dictatorships has been said to have hindered a proper development of the citizens’ political maturity. Without pursuing Hegel’s argument any further, suffice
it to say that he makes a distinction between the members of the civil society who remain "bourgeois" and those of the state who become proper "citizens."

Marx sees the emergence of the citizen as part of the process of political emancipation and resorts to Hegel’s concepts. Elaborating on the questionable distinction between “man” (meaning human being in general) and “citizen” as used in the title of the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,” Marx argues that the Revolution has reduced civil society to a private, egoistic realm, depriving it and its members of their political attribute under feudalism, such as it was. A further distinction is made between the “real man” as the selfish individual and the “true man” as the abstract citizen, a distinction backed by an earlier somewhat similar argument according to which practice is the exception while theory is the rule. Marx quotes Rousseau approvingly on changing human nature, integrating the solitary individual into a larger whole, and removing from a person his or her individual powers in exchange for new ones which a person can only use with the help of others. For Marx political emancipation has succeeded (and with it the proper emergence of the citizen) only when “the real individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen” and when the individual forces are turned into social forces from which the member of the community is inseparable (Marx 1975, p. 168).

The significance of the individual, freedom and its impact on his development were seen differently by liberal thinkers such as Constant, de Tocqueville and J.S. Mill. The assumption that self-interest and accumulating private property characterize human beings created some difficulties as far as civic responsibility was concerned. The problem had to do with the value of liberty for the growth of the idea of citizenship and the direction in which this development may lead, considering the main motivations of the citizens. Mill emphasized the crucial importance of education in order to be able to participate in political life. Taking part in political activity meant moral and intellectual development, an echo of ancient ideals. A new civic right was vigorously being outlined here whose decisive importance would lead to demands of, and in time, to concrete, legislation. Achieving the necessary maturity for the establishment of the individual in the society required more than just political participation. Gradually, Mill came to conceive of economic participation, as well. And for a proper incorporation of many members of the community, Mill also introduced the need for a certain amount fair distribution of property (Heater 1990, p. 73).

The incompatibility of the development of the self with the lack of a minimum of means of subsistence discussed by the English Idealists much influenced by T.H. Green was steadily bringing into the idea of a citizenship the importance of welfare. The role of education increased even more in the emancipation of citizens envisaged by these thinkers. In late Victorian England there were many educational initiatives, but it was probably Green and his disciples who were the main advocates of a “comprehensive system of schools” whose purpose was to modify the class system (Heater 1990, pp. 81-82). By now the idea of citizenship and its theoretical and practical framework were so clearly consolidated that one of Green’s fellow thinkers even suggested a university
degree in citizenship. More than other philosophers, Green’s ideas turned into practical initiatives due to his disciples who in due course occupied high Civil Service positions.

The growing complexity of the modern state, a necessary condition for providing the kind of welfare suggested by Green, created also a paradox through the very bureaucratization of the state. It has been noted that the individual needs the state to enjoy citizenship, but this becomes difficult in a bureaucratized mass democracy where Weber saw the danger of elitism (Turner 1986, pp. 107-108) Taking struggle and gradual integration as his criteria, Turner has seen the development of the concept of citizenship, as far as granting rights is concerned, as four expanding waves from particularity to universality. From the few male property owners, to the inclusion of all men, then of women, the aged, children, and then of the environment, the spectacular range of this expansion implies the gradual abandonment of property, gender, age, and organic structure as decisive criteria of ascribing rights (Turner 1986, pp. 92-99). Such an all-encompassing universalism eliminates the significance of status and places the question of citizenship on a new foundation.

The expansion of the concept of citizenship in the twentieth century has been seen not only from the point of view of new categories to be included, but also of new rights or ‘liberties’ to be enjoyed (Walzer 1989, p. 217). The element of struggle drives forward development according to Walzer’s argument as well, a struggle which will cease when a complete set of benefits is enjoyed by all citizens. The possession of a combination of civil, political and social rights including participation in the work of the government has been qualified as a form of substantial citizenship in the distinction made between this category and that of formal citizenship (Bottomore in Marshall & Bottomore 1992, p. 66). Once the ideal of equality has been established as a concrete political goal realizable in practice, citizenship has become an instrument of correcting various forms of inequality (political, social, economical). Marshall’s argument that citizenship has developed in conflict with capitalism has its relevance as welfare systems have become increasingly possible this century. Marshall presented his theory at the end of the 1940s when the British Labour Government was undertaking comprehensive welfare reforms and was probably aware of the momentous changes in the British society.

This was part of the steady advance of democracy with a series of political and social consequences. In the process, a number of disadvantaged groups were “catching up on their rights” (Heater 1990, p. 173). Citizenship, still evolving at the beginning of this century, has been developing as a result of the expansion of democracy, as witnessed by Marshall’s argument, but also as a result of nationalism. The status of citizenship has been identified at times with membership of a cultural and ethnic sphere (Heater 1990, p. 171). The extreme instance, Nazi Germany in the 1930s, is in sharp contrast with the development of the concept of citizenship which takes into account two other important contemporary elements, migration and European integration. Coming closer to our time, the suggestions of what the idea and status of citizenship ought to be are not always matched by their presence in reality. Yet, these
arguments shape policies and those which are not yet implemented may well materialize in practice.

One such suggestion starts from the changing circumstances after 1945 in the fields of labour and universal rights. The increased migration of workers, decolonization and the intensifying debates about human rights as well as international legislation ascribing rights to individuals, irrespective of the status of their membership in a particular state, all these circumstances have created a favourable ground to the creation of a "postnational" model of citizenship (Soysal 1996, pp. 19-20). The territorial dimension is less important here and the national criterion is not decisive for the ascribing of rights, two elements which normally define the membership status in a community. Developing citizenship in this manner would entail a "multiplicity of memberships" and changing the basis of legitimation of citizenship from national criteria to "the global ideologies of human rights" (Soysal 1996, p. 23). Other discussions about the re-conceptualization of citizenship in a post- or non-national context have explored this notion within the framework of the European integration initiatives and the effect of the Maastricht Treaty on the emergence of a possible European citizenship (Meehan 1993, pp. 6-7 and passim). Leaving nationality behind, it was only to be expected that a new kind of citizenship would be accompanied by the efforts to articulate a new identity. Here the option of the European Commission to rely on the criterion of culture has been seen as a questionable "short cut" which may hinder the transition to a post-national Union citizenship (Hansen 1998, pp. 73-74).

The contested nature of the notion of citizenship has recurred throughout the recent debates which have underlined the importance of the context in the development of this idea. It is enough to note that a shift of emphasis from citizenship as a set of freedoms to a set of roles or of moral qualities would lead to a whole range of concepts and definitions. The suggestion that modern citizenship on the whole is a "profoundly pluralist mechanism" resting on representation and corporation is one attempt to solve the difficulty (Leca 1992, p. 29). The resort to phenomena of the modern world (migration, international legislation on human rights, European integration) as evidence for the need to re-think citizenship can also be seen as attempts to leave behind the criteria of birth and residence (jus sanguinis and jus solis), despite stubborn resistance in various quarters. This seems to amount to an effort to think of citizenship in terms of integration and extension of benefits as opposed to the insistence on mechanisms of exclusion.

The two recurring lines of thought about citizenship determined by the individual and the collective point of view have been clarified by Habermas who considered them as belonging to a legal and a moral manner, respectively, of conceiving the status of a member in a community (Habermas 1995, pp. 261 ff). The liberal outlook with its roots in the natural law invoked by Locke sees the citizen as a member of an association, enjoying a clear set of rights which can preserve the individual as a separate entity. The communitarian argument drawing on Aristotle considers the citizen as part of an "ethical community" where, due to the degree of integration, the person's identity is formed in a process, of sharing, participation and intersubjectivity. Carrying the
argument forward, Habermas has asserted that individual rights and social security can equally lead to a situation of the citizenship as a client. Habermas had referred to a model of "deliberative democracy" where citizenship is shaped by the "procedural rationality of a political will-formation" (ibid, p. 269) whose "discursive character" proceeds within a public sphere stabilized by both liberal and egalitarian values. Bringing the issue close to the concrete European circumstances, Habermas has noted the slight diminution of the sovereignty of states and the gradual change of a world public sphere into a political reality which opens the way from state to world citizenship.

Along similar lines of expansion, what appears as an emerging European citizenship has been likened to Roman citizenship, a direction of conceptual, legal and political development which creates problems when it comes to participation (Meehan 1993, p. 2). This aspect has been stressed by Chantal Mouffe who has discussed it in the context of recovering "the idea of a commonality of an ethico-political bond" between citizens without sacrificing individual liberty and rights (Mouffe 1992, p. 230). It may be that the risk of a diffuse moral and political sense in vast communities may require as solution to Mouffe’s fears a concentration on a version of citizenship emerging within a restricted space. Would this indicated the rise of local citizenship?
The Trajectory of an Idea

This brief survey has looked at the way the concept of citizenship has been elaborated throughout the ages as a solution to a problem, a reflection of (and on) an existing situation, or as an explanation of a longer development. The attribute of belonging to a community has been chiefly determined by the outlook on human nature and the changing shape of the social, economic and political structures. Often both factors have shaped a particular idea of citizenship, for instance Aristotle's concept of human fulfilment and the concrete features of the Athenian state. In addition, the significance of the individual or of the collective has played a decisive role in defining the manner of belonging to a community.

The intellectual background of various epochs has provided the framework, and therefore the limitations as well, within which the quality of belonging has been defined. Since this status implies various degrees of participation in the affairs of the community with shifting emphases on rights and duties, and it also implies questions of access to resources, the discussion of citizenship has been part of a political argument. Yet, until about the time of the French Revolution political thought has been interwoven with theological, philosophical and even scientific issues. At the end of the eighteenth century political ideas began to acquire an increasingly autonomous field. The emergence of the main ideologies provided a new intellectual sphere where aspects of citizenship could be discussed on their own terms. Evidence from other fields was less and less invoked; the impact of Hobbes' mechanistic view of the world on his political theory is hardly paralleled by a modern impact of the latest discoveries in physics on the concept of citizenship. (There may be the odd reference to biology when discussing civic matters, but such connections are regarded as dubious.)

It can be argued that once citizenship is debated as part of an independent field of political thought, the emphasis is placed on more precisely outlined elements such as, civil, political and social rights, rather than on the more speculative approaches. The development of the idea of citizenship has indeed received significant contributions from arguments such as those about the purposeful nature of human beings seeking happiness through rational action as described by Aristotle, about the pact with the sovereign for the sake of protection as suggested by Bodin and Hobbes, or about the benefits of the identification with the collective as imagined by Rousseau. Questions of this nature appear to have been replaced by issues to do with legal and administrative aspects determined by cultural belonging, inclusion and exclusion, all these in the context of a rapidly changing world.
References
